Bedrock uniBTC

Contract Addresses

uniBTC Token Layer

Contract	Address	Role
uniBTC token proxy	0x004E9C3EF86bc1ca1f0bB5C7662861Ee93350568	User-facing uniBTC token, EIP-1967 transparent proxy
uniBTC token implementation	0xe0E6a124d500BE28BBdC47e6123E68B23b039cAD	Token implementation
uniBTC ProxyAdmin	0x029E4FbDAa31DE075dD74B2238222A08233978f6	Upgrade authority for uniBTC token, uniBTC Vault, CCIPPeer, live withdrawal router, asset supply feeder, and directBTC

Bridge / Cross-Chain Mint Layer

Contract	Address	Role
Chainlink CCIP BurnMintTokenPool 1.5.1	0x1689C22eD5435e49071CFc208D1Ac6F2A2274490	Registered uniBTC pool in the CCIP TokenAdminRegistry; holds MINTER_ROLE; owner() and registry token administrator = Bedrock admin Safe 0xAeE01705… (3/5)
Bedrock CCIPPeer	0x55a67cf07b8a9A09FB6D565279287cfE4Ab60eDc	Bedrock-custom CCIP messaging contract; holds MINTER_ROLE; upgradeable proxy under the uniBTC ProxyAdmin
Free Tunnel bridge proxy	0x70aF4743F85E5E74E3b6dDFa38926c0a762Ad21C	Third-party Free Tunnel (Free Protocol) bridge; holds MINTER_ROLE; not mentioned in Bedrock's uniBTC bridge docs
Free Tunnel hub	0x690357e684F7661911CED0f857a5920E983853aB	Publishes the only implementation the Tunnel admin can install; owner is a 3-of-4 multisig 0xb58F7aC2…

uniBTC Protocol Layer

Contract	Address	Role
uniBTC Vault proxy	0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da	Mint/redeem uniBTC against allowed wrapped BTC
uniBTC Vault implementation	0x01e9161D1621466eB086651FD514d3eFb8C3752E	VaultWithoutNative implementation
Chainlink uniBTC PoR feed	0xc590D9fb8eE78a0909dFF341ccf717000b7b7fF2	uniBTC reserve feed, 18 decimals, 2% deviation
uniBTC supply feeder	0xE542919E4b281f10b437F947c8Ba224DdfaBc716	Operator-reported totalTokenSupply() used by the Vault; differs from dashboard supply

Redemption, Operators and Supply Reporting

Contract	Address	Role
Ethereum DelayRedeemRouter	0xAA732c9c110A84d090a72da230eAe1E779f89246	Live app withdrawal router; implementation 0x720081e3ee2b1542e341afc793de20b08beb859d, under the uniBTC ProxyAdmin
Legacy DelayRedeemRouter	0xbb45b3a09bffc15747d1a331775fa408e587f38d	Superseded router with zero debt that still holds Vault OPERATOR_ROLE; implementation 0x6e542567d4744d648f6ab47ac80becd02e47ac09; EIP-1967 admin is EOA 0x3eea50ba…
BurnProxy	0x4519c8e32b080a778f2ae188d5fdcd98175f0caf	Vault operator; burn only; owned by admin Safe
TransferProxy	0xf0ab759d3a1a4956e8c3c52c71ccb50f20bc342b	Vault operator; transfers allowed assets to the ops Safe; owned by admin Safe
FBTCProxy	0xa3a30f627dbc02aff3c0a736a065443a0e85b1ae	Vault operator; non-upgradeable; LockedFBTC mint/redeem calls; operational EOA 0x9251fd3d79522bb2243a58fff1db43e25a495aab holds its admin and operator roles
Supply feeder implementation	0xf50dbaf3d057164fc79c1aa435ffa011c6bcdae9	uniBTCRate: operators write supply and reserve values; no supply-update timestamp checked by the Vault
Vault asset supply feeder	0x94C7F81E3B0458daa721Ca5E29F6cEd05CCCE2B3	Sigma; per-token totalSupply(address) input to deposit-cap checks
directBTC	0xA700992A9815d3bfECEDfE51B030fD294Bc0b090	Bedrock accounting token accepted by the Vault; MINTER_ROLE held by the Vault and contract 0x91fd8c7a…; admin Safe is DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE

Governance Layer

Controller	Address	Type	Controls
uniBTC ops Safe	0xC9dA980fFABbE2bbe15d4734FDae5761B86b5Fc3	Safe 3/5	Owns uniBTC ProxyAdmin; DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on uniBTC token, Vault and live router; FREEZER_ROLE on token
Bedrock admin Safe	0xAeE017052DF6Ac002647229D58B786E380B9721A	Safe 3/5	Owns CCIP pool, BurnProxy and TransferProxy; CCIPPeer and directBTC DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE
Operational EOA	0x9251fd3d79522bb2243a58fff1db43e25a495aab	EOA	Vault MANAGER_ROLE/PAUSER_ROLE, supply feeder admin/operator, CCIP rate-limit admin, router and CCIPPeer pauser, FBTCProxy admin
Legacy router admin	0x3eea50ba10952e5e0dfaa50ecfcc5ab19ad591ef	EOA	EIP-1967 admin of the legacy router, which holds Vault OPERATOR_ROLE
Supply feeder proxy admin	0x899c284A89E113056a72dC9ade5b60E80DD3c94f	EOA	EIP-1967 admin of the supply feeder; also token freezeToRecipient

Signer overlap: signer 0x09610d4239c8f3413509202DCcC7e27C6B0a47A3 appears in multiple Bedrock governance Safes, and signer 0x1fc76b7C6F092e0566Ce9Bbb9c6803Ba5e45Ba32 appears in both the uniBTC and brBTC Safe set. The latter also individually holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and PAUSER_ROLE on the legacy router.

How uniBTC Works

• Deposit assets: the Ethereum Vault allowlist contains WBTC, FBTC, cbBTC, and Bedrock directBTC; directBTC has no remaining mint headroom. M-BTC is a reserve/input dependency on Merlin, not an Ethereum Vault deposit asset. uniBTC is routed separately by the bridge contracts.
• Mint flow: User deposits a permitted wrapped BTC asset into the Vault mint function and atomically receives uniBTC 1:1 in 8-decimal BTC units.
• PoR gate: mint() applies the checkReserve modifier: it reverts if the Chainlink reserve feed is older than feederHeartbeat = 86,400s, and compares reserves with the uniBTC supply feeder. The check is skipped entirely if either feeder address is zero or adequacyRatio is zero.
• Adequacy ratio: adequacyRatio = 900; checkReserve requires supply * adequacyRatio / 1000 <= reserves, so minting is permitted while PoR reserves are at least 90% of the feeder's supply value. This is not a strict 1:1 mint gate, and the feeder value is 700.93 uniBTC below the contemporaneous dashboard total; see Provability.
• Ungated operator path: execute(target, data, value) is restricted only to OPERATOR_ROLE, the service switch, and an allowlist of targets that includes the uniBTC token. Because the Vault itself holds MINTER_ROLE, any operator can make the Vault call uniBTC.mint without checkReserve, deposit transfer or caps; see Token Mint Authority.
• Redeem flow: the live Ethereum router enforces 8 days + 1 second, a 0.5% fee, and a quota refilling at 2.00016 WBTC/day with a 0.5 WBTC maximum available bucket. Only WBTC is redeemable (isBtclisted). It is unpaused and its whitelist is disabled. After 30 days, claimPrincipals returns queued uniBTC, not BTC backing.
• Custody: Bedrock docs do not name the BTC custodian(s), signers, or full address-control model for the backing wallets monitored by Chainlink PoR.
• Cross-chain: Chainlink CCIP is the documented canonical bridge path (BurnMintTokenPool with 14 configured lanes). Onchain enumeration also found two additional live Ethereum mint paths: a Bedrock-custom CCIPPeer contract and a third-party Free Tunnel bridge that Bedrock's uniBTC bridge documentation does not mention. uniBTC is deployed across many chains; Ethereum is one slice of total supply.
• Freeze authority: The uniBTC token implements FREEZER_ROLE with a frozenUsers mapping and a freezeToRecipient address. The ops Safe holds FREEZER_ROLE, and freezeToRecipient is the EOA 0x899c284A…. freezeUsers, unfreezeUsers and setFreezeToRecipient emit no events. Token-level freezing of user balances is a governance-controlled loss/censorship path.

Token Mint Authority

Mint mechanism: Role-gated AccessControl. mint(address,uint256) on the uniBTC token is onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE); burn/burnFrom are standard permissionless holder burns. The role is not enumerable onchain, so holders were reconstructed from a full RoleGranted/RoleRevoked event scan on the token (26 events from deployment through block 25,981,132; the latest is a May 7, 2026 MINTER_ROLE revocation) and each current holder confirmed via hasRole.

Mint requires backing: No — at the token level any MINTER_ROLE holder can issue unbacked uniBTC. Backing checks live in the callers: the Vault mint() path is PoR-gated (to 90% adequacy), the Vault execute() path is not, and the bridge paths rely on burn/lock on the source chain.

Current uniBTC token MINTER_ROLE holders on Ethereum (verified September 15, 2026; read on the token contract, not on the holders):

Minter / Role Holder	Address	Notes
uniBTC Vault	0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da	mint() is PoR-gated with adequacyRatio = 900. execute() lets five operator contracts invoke uniBTC.mint through the Vault with no reserve check.
Chainlink CCIP BurnMintTokenPool 1.5.1	0x1689C22eD5435e49071CFc208D1Ac6F2A2274490	Registered in the CCIP TokenAdminRegistry (getPool(uniBTC) verified). Burn/mint model — the CCIP message path can mint native uniBTC supply. owner() = Bedrock admin Safe (3/5). Inbound and outbound rate limits are enabled on all 14 configured lanes; sizes differ by lane.
Bedrock CCIPPeer	0x55a67cf07b8a9A09FB6D565279287cfE4Ab60eDc	Bedrock-custom CCIP messaging contract predating the token pool. Upgradeable proxy administered by the uniBTC ProxyAdmin (i.e. the 3/5 ops Safe). Source and destination allowlists are enabled only for BNB Chain and BOB among the pool's lanes; no messages in the 30 days to the snapshot.
Free Tunnel bridge	0x70aF4743F85E5E74E3b6dDFa38926c0a762Ad21C	Third-party Free Protocol bridge (TunnelContract behind DelayedERC1967Proxy, mint mode). Mints require 3-of-4 executor signatures; admin is EOA 0x0014Eb4A…; upgradeTunnel installs only the hub's current implementation (version 20250105) and upgradeToAndCall is disabled; executor rotation has a built-in 36h–5d delay. No events in the 30 days to the snapshot. Not mentioned in Bedrock's uniBTC bridge docs. The same contract also holds MINTER_ROLE on Bedrock's brBTC.

Token admin / freeze authority: the ops Safe 0xC9dA980f… (3/5) holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE (can grant MINTER_ROLE to any address with no timelock — an unbacked-mint escalation path) and FREEZER_ROLE (token-level user freezing; freezeToRecipient is EOA 0x899c284A89E113056a72dC9ade5b60E80DD3c94f).

Single-EOA mint path through the legacy router

EOA: 0x3eea50ba10952e5e0dfaa50ecfcc5ab19ad591ef. It is the EIP-1967 proxy admin of the legacy withdrawal router. The Vault holds uniBTC token MINTER_ROLE, and the legacy router holds Vault OPERATOR_ROLE.

Not exploitable through the current router code; exploitable after an upgrade that only this EOA can perform:

• The current router implementation calls Vault.execute in one place only, to burnFrom uniBTC during redemption claims. No function lets a caller choose the target or calldata. The router's DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE holder, ops Safe signer 0x1fc76b7C6F092e0566Ce9Bbb9c6803Ba5e45Ba32, can change only router settings (token list, whitelist, day cap, delay), none of which mints.
• The router is a TransparentUpgradeableProxy whose admin slot holds 0x3eea50ba10952e5e0dfaa50ecfcc5ab19ad591ef directly. There is no ProxyAdmin contract or Safe above it. That EOA alone can call upgradeTo at any time, with no delay, and install code that passes uniBTC.mint calldata to Vault.execute.
• Rechecked at block 25,990,808: same admin (no code, nonce 29), same implementation, Vault OPERATOR_ROLE still held, uniBTC still an allowed target.
• Live-chain simulation (eth_call, no transaction sent) at block 25,990,834: the admin has no code, so it is a private-key EOA rather than a contract. The proxy bytecode contains all transparent-proxy admin functions (stored as negated selector constants). admin() called by the EOA returns the EOA, and upgradeTo from the EOA succeeds while the same call from a random address reverts. Vault.execute(uniBTC, mint(0x…dEaD, 100,000 uniBTC), 0) succeeds with the router as sender and reverts with AccessControl from a random address.
• Closing the path: the ops Safe, as Vault DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, can revoke the router's OPERATOR_ROLE; or the EOA can move the proxy admin to the Safe-owned ProxyAdmin.

Five contracts hold Vault OPERATOR_ROLE: BurnProxy, TransferProxy, FBTCProxy, the live router and the legacy router. The first four are owned by a Safe, non-upgradeable with fixed call patterns, or upgradeable only through the ops-Safe ProxyAdmin. The legacy router is different:

• 0xbb45b3a0… is a verified OpenZeppelin TransparentUpgradeableProxy. Its EIP-1967 admin slot is 0x3eea50ba…, an address with no code and nonce 29.
• EOA 0x3eea50ba10952e5e0dfaa50ecfcc5ab19ad591ef deployed the proxy on September 20, 2024. The only AdminChanged event is the one at creation.
• The key is in active general use: its latest outgoing transaction was a contract ownership transfer on August 10, 2026, and its history includes trading-order, bridge and token-transfer calls.
• The router has no remaining debt (totalDebt = 0) and no allowlisted redemption tokens, so its role serves no current redemption function.
• The Vault's allowedTargetList includes the uniBTC token, WBTC, cbBTC, FBTC, directBTC, the ops Safe and LockedFBTC 0xd681C557….
• The path is not new. The Vault received uniBTC MINTER_ROLE on April 13, 2024, the legacy router received Vault OPERATOR_ROLE on September 20, 2024, and uniBTC became an allowed execute target in the October 1, 2024 post-exploit relaunch. It has existed since then, including at the August 10, 2026 assessment, which enumerated direct token minters but not Vault operators or their upgrade authority.

The PoR limit (feederSupply * 0.9 <= Chainlink reserves) is the checkReserve modifier on Vault mint() only; neither uniBTC.mint (plain onlyRole(MINTER_ROLE)) nor Vault.execute applies it. Local anvil forks at the snapshot block confirmed the path end to end:

• Impersonating EOA 0x3eea50ba10952e5e0dfaa50ecfcc5ab19ad591ef, upgradeTo on the legacy router succeeded; the same upgrade from an unrelated address failed.
• From the router, Vault.execute(uniBTC, mint(0x…dEaD, 100,000 uniBTC), 0) succeeded and raised Ethereum supply from 2,981.12556288 to 102,981.12556288 uniBTC — about 21 times the 4,640.52 BTC Chainlink reserves, far above the ~5,156 uniBTC the 0.9 check would permit.
• Control: after setting the supply feeder to 100,000 uniBTC so the check fails, a WBTC deposit through Vault.mint() reverted with SYS013, while the same execute mint still succeeded.

A compromise or misuse of EOA 0x3eea50ba10952e5e0dfaa50ecfcc5ab19ad591ef can therefore mint arbitrary unbacked uniBTC on Ethereum and transfer the Vault's allowlisted assets, with no multisig, timelock, PoR check or cap. The dilution would affect every uniBTC holder and every venue accepting uniBTC, and bridged supply could propagate it within CCIP rate limits. Revoking the legacy router's Vault OPERATOR_ROLE (ops Safe as Vault admin) or moving its proxy admin to the ops-Safe ProxyAdmin would close this path.

Observed minting (30 days to the snapshot, blocks 25,765,132–25,981,132): 73 uniBTC mints. The CCIP pool minted 3.00640757 uniBTC across 71 transfers (largest 1.31983465); the Vault minted 0.06402319 uniBTC across two FBTC deposits, each with a Vault Minted event. CCIPPeer and Free Tunnel minted nothing. No mint was attributable to any other address.

Historical grants (from the event scan): several temporary MINTER_ROLE grants have been made and revoked over the token's life, including grant-mint-revoke same-block patterns by the ops Safe and two temporary grants to the operational EOA 0x9251Fd3D… (revoked). This is evidence of manual, admin-driven supply operations outside the vault path.

Rate limits / supply caps: none at the token level. CCIP pool lanes, identical inbound and outbound:

Bucket	Lanes	Refill
2 uniBTC	Arbitrum One	231,428 sats/s (199.953792 uniBTC/day)
2 uniBTC	Optimism, Mantle	11,574 sats/s (~10 uniBTC/day)
2 uniBTC	BNB Chain, Berachain, Base, Aptos	2,315 sats/s (~2 uniBTC/day)
2 uniBTC	Solana	232 sats/s (~0.2 uniBTC/day)
0.5 uniBTC	BOB	2,315 sats/s (~2 uniBTC/day)
2 satoshis	Unichain, B², X Layer, Ink, HyperEVM	1 sat/s (effectively closed)

These are lane-specific throttles, not an aggregate supply bound. Pool getRateLimitAdmin() is the operational EOA, which can reconfigure them. Chain names are from Chainlink's chain-selectors registry. Free Tunnel and complete CCIPPeer lane limits remain TODO.

Non-Ethereum deployments: complete mint/burn authority enumeration for every non-Ethereum uniBTC deployment (30+ chains) remains TODO.

Audits and Due Diligence Disclosures

Scope	Firm	Date	Link
uniBTC	BlockSec	Jun 12, 2024	PDF
uniBTC	PeckShield	Oct 1, 2024	PDF
uniBTC	BlockSec	Oct 30, 2024	PDF

The October 2024 audits are post-exploit re-engagements covering the patched uniBTC vault. BlockSec also published a November 15, 2024 v1.1 revision, reviewing a redeem-logic update and the contracts/contracts/ and ccip/ scope. This is a revision of the October engagement, not a fourth independent audit. The current audit index (rechecked September 15, 2026) additionally lists May 6 and June 18, 2026 PeckShield reports for cuniBTC and cuniBTC-SymbioticProxy; those scopes do not establish a re-audit of the live uniBTC Vault, reporting inputs, operator contracts, or reserve custody. The three core uniBTC engagements and the v1.1 revision are from 2024; no later review establishing coverage of the complete live uniBTC trust boundary was found. No top-tier audit engagement (Trail of Bits, OpenZeppelin, ChainSecurity, Spearbit, Cantina) was found for uniBTC.

The age of the reviews matters for two reasons. First, an audit is point-in-time evidence: it only supports the code, configuration, assumptions, and dependencies that were in scope when the work was performed. Even if the core vault bytecode remains unchanged, uniBTC's current security depends on live governance configuration, PoR inputs, operator contracts, cross-chain deployments, custody and Babylon operations, and the material M-BTC/Merlin exposure described below.

Bug Bounty

• No public Immunefi / Cantina / Sherlock / Code4rena bug bounty program found.
• No SEAL Safe Harbor

Historical Track Record

• Time in production: uniBTC launched in 2024; DeFiLlama first records Bedrock uniBTC on Oct 29, 2024.

• TVL (DeFiLlama, September 15, 2026): Bedrock uniBTC reported $357.92M. Major slices: Bitcoin $132.75M, Ethereum $99.51M, Merlin $74.67M, BOB $31.00M, BNB Chain $19.14M. The earliest daily observation in the 30-day window was $292.95M (August 18): +22.18%, with a $236.32M–$385.90M range. TVL is USD-valued collateral, not token supply.

• Peak TVL: Bedrock uniBTC peaked at $638.3M on July 15, 2025.

• Minimum after launch: $109.4M on Nov 2, 2024, shortly after the Sept 2024 exploit.

• Ethereum total supply: 2,981.12556288 uniBTC (298,112,556,288 sats) at the snapshot.

• Supply and reserves: Chainlink PoR reports 4,640.515622996713140279 BTC, updated September 14 at 19:58:09 UTC, 38,534 seconds before the block (within the 86,400-second heartbeat). The reserve ratio depends on which supply figure is used:

  Supply figure	uniBTC	Chainlink reserves ÷ supply
  Ethereum uniBTC totalSupply() only	2,981.12556288	~155.7%
  Vault supply feeder totalTokenSupply() (what the Vault checks)	3,845.74449304	120.67%
  Bedrock reserve API total_supply, sum of 20 chains	4,546.67793	102.06%

  The supply feeder is meant to hold global supply, not Ethereum supply. It matched the all-chain total until the September 13 update and is now 700.93 uniBTC short (see Provability). The ~102% all-chain ratio is the meaningful coverage figure; 120.67% comes only from the feeder's missing supply. The API's own reserves are 4,639.417015 BTC (102.04% of its supply). Per-chain supplies are Bedrock-reported and were not verified onchain, and double counting through lock-mode bridges on other chains was not ruled out, so neither ratio proves complete liabilities.

Security Incident: September 27, 2024 - uniBTC Mint Exploit

• Loss: approximately $2M, reported as roughly 649.6 WETH by public incident analyses.
• Root cause: The uniBTC Vault mint flow did not properly validate the deposit asset's price/decimals against the uniBTC issuance rate. Public analyses describe an attacker depositing WETH and receiving uniBTC 1:1, then swapping uniBTC for WETH.
• Affected contract: uniBTC Vault 0x047D41F2544B7F63A8e991aF2068a363d210d6Da, the same proxy address still in use after the patch.
• Exploiter: EOA 0x2bFB373017349820dda2Da8230E6b66739BE9F96.
• Response: Bedrock paused the vault, upgraded the implementation, added Chainlink Proof-of-Reserve / Secure Mint checks, and re-audited with PeckShield and BlockSec in October 2024. Fuzzland publicly took responsibility because the attacker was reportedly a Fuzzland ex-employee; Fuzzland reimbursed Bedrock with company funds (Cointelegraph, June 2025; Cryptonews).

The exploit occurred on the same vault proxy that remains in production. Post-exploit controls are materially stronger on mint(), but the Vault's execute() path and its operator set are outside that gate, and future upgrade or validation mistakes remain a high-impact path because there is no onchain timelock.

Funds Management

Accessibility

Token	Mint	Redeem	Fees	Permissioning
uniBTC	Atomic, subject to PoR and per-asset headroom	8 days + 1 second, WBTC only	0.5% fee; ~2 WBTC/day refill; 0.5 WBTC quota bucket	Whitelist disabled; blacklist and pause controls remain

Collateralization

• uniBTC is intended to be backed 1:1 by wrapped BTC assets and native/restaked BTC positions.
• The cross-chain product accepts wrapped BTC inputs; the Ethereum allowlist is WBTC, FBTC, cbBTC and directBTC, while M-BTC is a Merlin dependency. Counterparty quality is mixed: WBTC and cbBTC are more established; FBTC and M-BTC are newer issuer/custody dependencies.
• Dashboard reserves equal ≈102.04% of dashboard supply; the Vault instead compares Chainlink reserves to a lower, operator-reported supply value. Its nominal 90% requirement therefore does not establish 90% coverage of complete global liabilities.
• The Ethereum Vault holds 0.46065725 WBTC, 0.06802893 FBTC, 0.00315141 cbBTC and 1,458.9998 directBTC; the ops Safe holds 0.01 WBTC. The majority of backing sits outside the Ethereum vault contract, including native BTC/restaking/custody arrangements monitored through PoR.

Ethereum deposit limits and redemption liquidity

Vault allowlist getters give the following 8-decimal BTC-unit values at the snapshot. Headroom is cap minus supplyFeeder.totalSupply(token), not a measure of independently available backing.

Asset	Cap (BTC units)	Feeder usage	Remaining headroom
WBTC	50	0.46065725	49.53934275
cbBTC	50	0.00315141	49.99684859
FBTC	1,300	1,283.74292562	16.25707438
Bedrock directBTC	1,458.9998	1,458.9998	0; mint capacity exhausted

All four are allowlisted and individually unpaused. directBTC is an internal accounting token; it must not be counted as additional independent Bitcoin backing.

M-BTC / Merlin concentration

The Bedrock reserve API reports 4,639.417015 BTC in total reserves at the snapshot:

Reserve type	BTC	Share
Native BTC on Bitcoin (44 published addresses)	3,647.635638	78.62%
M-BTC on Merlin	990.8738333	21.36%
Other wrapped / L2 BTC	~0.91	0.02%

Most reserves are native BTC held directly on Bitcoin, so that portion carries no wrapped-token issuer or bridge risk. These are dashboard classifications, not an independent reconciliation of Babylon positions or encumbrances. The M-BTC portion depends on Merlin's bridge, described below. The published Merlin reserve address 0xF977…AB18 is the second-largest M-BTC holder, with 17.39% of 5,697.45 M-BTC supply on September 15, 2026.

M-BTC is not native BTC; Merlin documents it as a receipt minted against Bitcoin Layer 1 assets deposited through Merlin's bridge. This adds Merlin bridge custody, relayer, chain-liveness, and redemption risk beneath uniBTC. Merlin launched mainnet in February 2024 and M-BTC claims opened in March 2024, so the product is no longer brand new but remains materially younger and less trust-minimized than established wrapped-BTC rails. Merlin's official bridge documentation states that the bridge is upgradeable, multisig-managed, and has no timelock. Merlin's data-availability documentation also describes public DA as a "coming" solution, while the current design relies on its oracle/DAC layer and offchain proof-verification machinery rather than Bitcoin enforcing the full L2 state transition.

Provability

uniBTC has materially better reserve provability than brBTC because a Chainlink PoR feed is wired directly into the uniBTC Vault mint path. The Bedrock dashboard also exposes the constituent native-BTC addresses and wrapped-token reserve addresses; it is more than an unlinked aggregate chart. However, the supply denominator is an independent privileged input. Verified uniBTCRate source lets its operators write totalTokenSupply and totalReserve directly through update(); it does not aggregate chains onchain. The Vault uses only totalTokenSupply and checks no freshness or completeness for it.

The feeder's history makes the current discrepancy a recurring reporting fault rather than a one-off:

• Cadence: 653 Updated events since October 15, 2024, normally daily at about 07:50 UTC (median gap 24.0h; 90-day maximum 40.5h). All of the last 40 were sent by the second updater.
• One-day dips: on April 30, May 16, May 19, June 24, July 17, July 23 and August 23, 2026, totalTokenSupply fell by roughly 640–680 uniBTC and was restored by the next daily update (for example down on August 23 and restored on August 24).
• Current dip: the September 13 update lowered supply from 4,547.45892811 to 3,845.74449305 and totalReserve from 4,640.42301174 to 3,961.11682784. The September 14 update repeated the lower values. This is the first dip in the scanned history to persist through two updates.
• Size: the 700.93 uniBTC gap to the dashboard is close to the API's BOB supply (701.5560332 uniBTC). That is consistent with one chain's supply dropping out of the reporting job, but Bedrock has not disclosed the cause. TODO: confirm with Bedrock or independent BOB supply data.

During a dip the Vault's reserve check is looser: at 90% adequacy against Chainlink reserves it would admit up to about 1,310 uniBTC of feeder-reported supply growth, versus about 609 uniBTC against dashboard supply. Vault mints still require a 1:1 allowlisted deposit and cap headroom, so this weakens the reserve safeguard rather than creating unbacked supply by itself. Both published ratios exceed 100%, but neither establishes complete global liabilities.

Address visibility also does not prove the full operational state:

• The feed depends on a Bedrock-supplied address set.
• PoR validates balances, not legal ownership, private-key control, liabilities, encumbrances, or the ability to redeem those assets promptly.
• The Vault requires 90% of its operator-reported supply input; completeness of that denominator is unresolved.
• Approximately 21.36% of dashboard reserves are M-BTC, so proving that Bedrock holds the token does not independently prove the corresponding Bitcoin remains available behind Merlin's bridge.

Liquidity Risk

• Primary exit: the Ethereum router has an 8-day-plus-1-second delay, 0.5% fee, ~2 WBTC/day quota refill, and 0.5 WBTC maximum available quota. BTC settlement depends on Vault replenishment; 30-day usage was 17 requests totalling 0.33 WBTC.
• Indicative exits: CoW Protocol quote API responses into WBTC returned 0.99253745 WBTC for 1 uniBTC (0.75% below parity), 11.02803585 WBTC for 13 uniBTC (~$1M) (15.17% below) and 11.02805981 WBTC for 65 uniBTC (~$5M) (83.03% below). Quote IDs are in the snapshot evidence. These were unsigned, expiring indications, not executed swaps or guaranteed future fills. Aggregated onchain depth is roughly 11 WBTC; large exits remain severely constrained.
• Downstream integration: brBTC accepts uniBTC as an input asset. Stress in brBTC may create uniBTC flow pressure, and stress in uniBTC directly affects brBTC when uniBTC is used as backing.

Centralization & Control Risks

Governance

• uniBTC token and uniBTC Vault are upgradeable transparent proxies.
• The uniBTC ops Safe is 3-of-5 and owns the ProxyAdmin.
• The same Safe holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE on the uniBTC Vault.
• No Safe Guard or Delay module is configured on either Safe (verified September 15, 2026). A 3-of-5 signature can therefore upgrade implementations, grant uniBTC token MINTER_ROLE, or freeze user balances without an onchain delay.
• The ops Safe additionally holds DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and FREEZER_ROLE on the uniBTC token itself: it can grant mint authority to any address and freeze arbitrary user balances, with freezeToRecipient set to EOA 0x899c284A89E113056a72dC9ade5b60E80DD3c94f.
• A single EOA can mint unbacked uniBTC. The legacy router's proxy admin, EOA 0x3eea50ba10952e5e0dfaa50ecfcc5ab19ad591ef, can upgrade a contract holding Vault OPERATOR_ROLE and mint through Vault.execute, bypassing both the Safe and the PoR gate (fork-verified; see Token Mint Authority).
• Two bridge contracts and one Bedrock messaging contract hold live MINTER_ROLE (CCIP token pool, CCIPPeer, Free Tunnel); the Free Tunnel path is absent from Bedrock's public documentation.
• Signer overlap across Bedrock Safes weakens practical separation between product lines.

Delegated control paths

Full role-event reconstruction and hasRole confirmation establish the following additional authorities. All listed AccessControl roles are governed by their contract's DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE.

Contract / role	Holders	Effective control
Vault DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE	Ops Safe	Token/target allowlists, caps, asset feeder, and operator role grants and revocations
Vault MANAGER_ROLE	Operational EOA	Changes reserve/supply feeder addresses, heartbeat and adequacy ratio without a Safe transaction
Vault PAUSER_ROLE	Six EOAs: 0x0961…47A3, 0x9251…5aab, 0xaa0b…e034, 0xae4a…2973, 0xeea6…761f, 0xf6a4…8615	Stops service or pauses individual assets; includes the operational EOA and an ops Safe signer
Vault OPERATOR_ROLE	Five contracts	BurnProxy, FBTCProxy, live withdrawal router, legacy withdrawal router, and TransferProxy call execute on allowed targets, including uniBTC
Legacy router proxy admin	EOA 0x3eea50ba10952e5e0dfaa50ecfcc5ab19ad591ef	Replaces the legacy router implementation at will; through its Vault operator role, mints uniBTC and moves allowlisted Vault assets
Supply feeder admin / operators	Operational EOA 0x9251fd3d79522bb2243a58fff1db43e25a495aab administers; it and second updater hold OPERATOR_ROLE	Directly writes the PoR comparison's supply denominator; proxy admin slot is EOA 0x899c284A89E113056a72dC9ade5b60E80DD3c94f, outside the ops Safe ProxyAdmin
CCIP pool rate-limit admin	Operational EOA 0x9251fd3d79522bb2243a58fff1db43e25a495aab	Reconfigures per-lane throttles
CCIPPeer admin / pauser	Admin Safe / operational EOA 0x9251fd3d79522bb2243a58fff1db43e25a495aab	Configures accepted source peers / pauses messages; proxy upgrades remain with ops Safe
Live withdrawal router admin / pauser	Ops Safe / operational EOA 0x9251fd3d79522bb2243a58fff1db43e25a495aab	Changes fees, delays, quotas and permission lists / pauses redemptions

The admin Safe owns both BurnProxy and TransferProxy. TransferProxy can move allowlisted Vault assets to its immutable recipient, the ops Safe; it is not a user redemption queue. FBTCProxy can only issue LockedFBTC mint/redeem calls through the Vault. Legacy router DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE and PAUSER_ROLE are held by an individual ops Safe signer.

Programmability

mint() is programmatic and PoR-gated, which is a major strength relative to opaque custody wrappers. The gate combines Chainlink reserves with a manually updated supply denominator that is currently 700.93 uniBTC below the dashboard and has repeatedly dropped by a similar amount for a day. The Vault's operator execute() path sits outside the gate. Upgradeability, control by operational EOA 0x9251fd3d79522bb2243a58fff1db43e25a495aab over reporting and adequacy parameters, role-controlled outflows, and the explicit 90% threshold materially limit this assurance.

External Dependencies

Dependency	Used by uniBTC	Criticality
Chainlink PoR feed	Mint reserve gate	High - stale data halts mint(); wrong data can weaken mint safety
Chainlink CCIP	Cross-chain routing - BurnMintTokenPool + CCIPPeer both hold MINTER_ROLE; 14 lanes, per-lane rate limits enabled	High - bridge security affects multi-chain supply/peg, partially mitigated by rate limits
Free Tunnel (Free Protocol)	Cross-chain routing - bridge contract holds MINTER_ROLE, undocumented in Bedrock docs	High - third-party bridge with mint rights; 3-of-4 executor signatures, EOA admin 0x0014Eb4Ac6Dd1473b258d088E6EF214b2BCdc53C, hub-supplied upgrades
WBTC / FBTC / cbBTC	Accepted deposit assets	High - issuer/custody risk
M-BTC / Merlin bridge	~21.36% of dashboard reserves on September 15, 2026	High - bridge custody, relayer, upgrade, no-timelock, chain-liveness and redemption risk
Bitcoin network / native BTC custody	Backing assets	Critical
Babylon Labs / BTC restaking venues	Yield / restaking exposure	High
Undisclosed custody/signing setup	BTC backing control	Critical unknown

Operational Risk

• Team transparency: Bedrock/RockX leadership is public. Zhuling Chen is CEO of Bedrock and RockX; Alex Lam is a RockX co-founder.
• Legal structure: Per Bedrock Terms of Use, the website and protocol are operated by Golden Bull Enterprises Limited, formed under the laws of the British Virgin Islands.
• Documentation: Public docs cover minting, unstaking, audits, and PoR at a high level. Custodian identity, full signing model, operator contracts, supply-reporting methodology, and restitution txs remain undisclosed.
• Incident handling: The Sept 2024 response was credible (pause, patch, re-audit, PoR hardening, users made whole through Fuzzland reimbursement), but the incident remains a meaningful historical risk marker because it affected the same vault proxy still in production.
• Key hygiene: deployer EOA 0x3eea50ba10952e5e0dfaa50ecfcc5ab19ad591ef, used for unrelated transactions, has kept upgrade authority over a Vault operator for about two years after the router was superseded, and EOA 0x899c284A89E113056a72dC9ade5b60E80DD3c94f remains proxy admin of the supply feeder.

Monitoring

Critical — page immediately

Signal	Source / detection	Baseline	Alert when
Legacy router upgrade or admin use	Upgraded(address) / AdminChanged(address,address) on legacy router; EIP-1967 implementation slot; any transaction sent by admin EOA 0x3eea50ba10952e5e0dfaa50ecfcc5ab19ad591ef	Implementation 0x6e542567d4744d648f6ab47ac80becd02e47ac09; no AdminChanged since creation; last admin tx Aug 10, 2026	Any event, implementation change, or admin-EOA transaction
Mint outside the reserve gate	uniBTC Transfer(from = 0x0) where the Vault is the caller but the transaction has no Vault Minted(address,uint256) event (i.e. execute() path)	2 Vault mints in 30 days, both with Minted	Any occurrence
Unknown minter	uniBTC Transfer(from = 0x0) not accompanied by an event from the Vault, CCIP pool, CCIPPeer or Free Tunnel	73 mints in 30 days, all attributed	Any occurrence
Token role change	RoleGranted / RoleRevoked on uniBTC for MINTER_ROLE, DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, FREEZER_ROLE	4 minters; last event May 7, 2026	Any event
Vault operator or manager change	RoleGranted / RoleRevoked on the Vault for OPERATOR_ROLE, MANAGER_ROLE, DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE; TargetAllowed / TokenAllowed	5 operators; 7 allowed targets; no config events in 30 days	Any grant or allow event (a legacy router OPERATOR_ROLE revocation is a positive reassessment trigger)
Reserve gate parameters	Vault AdequacyRatioSet, PoRFeederSet, StopService, Paused; adequacyRatio(), chainlinkReserveFeeder(), uniBTCSupplyFeeder(), feederHeartbeat()	900; feeders 0xc590D9fb… / 0xE542919E…; 86,400s	Any event; ratio below 900 or zero; either feeder changed or zero
Upgrades of core proxies	Upgraded on uniBTC, Vault, CCIPPeer, live router, supply feeder, asset feeder, directBTC and Free Tunnel; OwnershipTransferred on the ProxyAdmin; AdminChanged on the supply feeder	Implementations listed in the evidence; ProxyAdmin owner unchanged since May 22, 2024	Any event
Reserves below supply	Chainlink PoR latestRoundData().answer vs reserve API total_supply (and per-chain totalSupply() where RPCs exist)	4,640.515623 BTC / 4,546.67793 uniBTC = 102.06%	Ratio < 100% (critical); < 101% (high)
Governance Safes	AddedOwner, RemovedOwner, ChangedThreshold, ChangedGuard, EnabledModule on the ops Safe and admin Safe	3/5 each; no guard or modules	Any event

High — alert within the hour

Signal	Source / detection	Baseline	Alert when
Supply feeder integrity	Supply feeder Updated(totalReserve, totalTokenSupply); compare with reserve API total_supply	3,845.74449304 vs 4,546.67793 (15.42% gap, active since Sep 13); daily ~07:50 UTC	Gap > 2% (currently firing); day-over-day change > 5%; no update for 48h; feeder RoleGranted / RoleRevoked
PoR staleness	PoR updatedAt age	38,534s	Age > 86,400s (Vault mint() reverts SYS013); answer moves > 2% in one round
Ops Safe activity and freezes	Ops Safe ExecutionSuccess, decoded; calls to uniBTC freezeUsers / unfreezeUsers / setFreezeToRecipient (no token events, so decode Safe calldata); poll freezeToRecipient()	No ops Safe tx in 30 days; nonce 101; recipient 0x899c284A…	Any ops Safe execution (decode target and selector); any freeze call; recipient change
CCIP inbound mint volume	CCIP pool Minted and TokensConsumed by lane	71 mints / 3.00640757 uniBTC in 30 days; largest 1.31983465	> 2 uniBTC minted in 24h; any lane bucket exhausted
CCIP configuration	Pool ChainConfigured, ChainRemoved, ChainRateLimiterConfigUpdated, RateLimitAdminSet, OwnershipTransferred; TokenAdminRegistry getPool(uniBTC) and administrator	14 lanes; limits in Token Mint Authority	Any event; pool or administrator change; any 2-satoshi lane raised
Dormant mint bridges	CCIPPeer MessageExecuted, SysSignerChange, allowlist changes; Free Tunnel TokenMintExecuted, AdminTransferred, Upgraded; poll getActiveExecutors() and hub currentTBMVersion()	No CCIPPeer or Tunnel events in 30 days; 4 executors, threshold 3; version 20250105	Any mint or configuration event; executor or hub version change
Vault asset outflows	WBTC / FBTC / cbBTC / directBTC Transfer(from = Vault)	20 WBTC outflows (0.27122798), all router claims; no FBTC, cbBTC or directBTC outflows	Any non-WBTC outflow; any WBTC outflow without a router DelayedRedeemsClaimed in the same tx
Redemption solvency	Router tokenDebts(WBTC) uncleared minus immature requests (from DelayedRedeemCreated timestamps) vs Vault WBTC balanceOf	0.75152598 uncleared; ~0.4916 matured; 0.46065725 in Vault	Matured debt > Vault WBTC for > 24h; a matured claim reverts
Redemption controls	Router Paused, TokensPaused, RateSet, MaxQuotaSet, RedeemDelaySet, RedeemFeeRateSet, BlacklistAdded, WhitelistEnabledSet, BtclistRemoved	Unpaused; 0.5 WBTC max quota; 2,315 sats/s; 691,201s delay; 50 bps fee	Any event

Recommended Frequency

Category	Frequency
Legacy router, unknown/ungated mints, role and upgrade events	Real-time
Reserve gate parameters, Safe owner/threshold changes	Real-time
PoR vs supply ratio, PoR staleness	Hourly
Supply feeder update and gap	After each daily update (~08:00 UTC) plus a 48h staleness check
CCIP/Tunnel/CCIPPeer mint volume and configuration	Real-time events; daily volume roll-up
Redemption solvency and router configuration	Hourly
M-BTC share, reserve address set, peg, depth, caps, TVL	Daily

Appendix: Contract Architecture

Governance Layer
================
uniBTC Ops Safe 0xC9dA980f... (3/5)
  |-- owns ProxyAdmin 0x029e4fbd...
  |     |-- admin --> uniBTC token 0x004E9C...
  |     |-- admin --> uniBTC Vault 0x047D41...
  |     `-- admin --> CCIPPeer, live router, asset feeder, directBTC
  `-- DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE --> uniBTC Vault, uniBTC token, live router
Bedrock Admin Safe 0xAeE01705... (3/5)
  `-- owns CCIP pool, BurnProxy, TransferProxy
EOAs
  |-- 0x3eea50ba... proxy admin --> legacy router (Vault OPERATOR_ROLE)
  |-- 0x899c284A... proxy admin --> supply feeder
  `-- 0x9251fd3D... Vault MANAGER, feeder operator, CCIP rate-limit admin

Token / Vault Layer
===================
uniBTC token 0x004E9C...0568
  |-- MINTER_ROLE: uniBTC Vault 0x047D41...D6Da
  |     |-- mint(): WBTC / FBTC / cbBTC / directBTC (cap exhausted)
  |     |     |-- checks Chainlink PoR 0xc590D9fb...
  |     |     `-- checks supply feeder 0xE542919E... (operator-written)
  |     `-- execute(): 5 operators, targets incl. uniBTC (no PoR check)
  |           `-- legacy router 0xbb45b3a0... <-- upgradeable by EOA 0x3eea50ba...
  |-- MINTER_ROLE: CCIP BurnMintTokenPool 0x1689C2... (owner: Bedrock admin Safe; 14 rate-limited lanes)
  |-- MINTER_ROLE: Bedrock CCIPPeer 0x55a67c... (proxy under ops-Safe ProxyAdmin)
  |-- MINTER_ROLE: Free Tunnel bridge 0x70aF47... (3/4 executors, EOA admin, hub-supplied upgrades, undocumented)
  `-- FREEZER_ROLE + DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE: ops Safe 0xC9dA98... (freeze users; grant minters; no timelock)

---

Reassessment Triggers

• Time-based: Reassess by December 15, 2026.
• TVL / supply-based: Reassess if uniBTC TVL or supply changes by more than +/-40% from the September 15, 2026 baseline: $357.92M TVL, 2,981.12556288 Ethereum uniBTC, and 4,546.67793 dashboard global uniBTC (dashboard supply remains unreconciled).
• Incident-based: Any exploit, depeg >2% sustained >1h, PoR reserve shortfall, redemption queue freeze, bridge failure, or governance compromise.
• Specific triggers:
  1. Any transaction from the legacy router admin EOA 0x3eea50ba10952e5e0dfaa50ecfcc5ab19ad591ef, any legacy router upgrade, or any mint through Vault.execute. Conversely, revocation of the legacy router's Vault OPERATOR_ROLE or moving its proxy admin to the ops-Safe ProxyAdmin warrants a prompt rescore of Governance.
  2. Chainlink uniBTC PoR feed reports backing below independently reconciled supply; supply feeder gap to dashboard supply above 2% for more than one further daily update (currently firing), or resolution of its cause.
  3. PoR feed stale beyond heartbeat.
  4. adequacyRatio is lowered or PoR feeder / supply feeder is changed.
  5. uniBTC token, Vault, router, feeder or directBTC implementation upgrade.
  6. ProxyAdmin or Safe ownership transfer.
  7. Safe owner addition/removal or threshold change.
  8. Disclosure of BTC custodian/signers or of the supply-reporting methodology.
  9. Introduction of an onchain timelock / Safe Delay module.
  10. New top-tier audit or bug bounty publication.
  11. M-BTC depegs, pauses redemption, changes bridge administrators, or changes its mint/burn implementation.
  12. Any RoleGranted for MINTER_ROLE, DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, or FREEZER_ROLE on the uniBTC token, any Vault OPERATOR_ROLE or MANAGER_ROLE grant, any freeze call, or any change to freezeToRecipient.
  13. Change of CCIP token pool, CCIPPeer upgrade or first mint in 30+ days, Free Tunnel executor/admin/version change or mint, or a mint from an address outside the four known minters.
  14. Supply feeder updater/admin change or proxy upgrade; withdrawal router upgrade, blacklist/whitelist change, quota reduction, or matured debt exceeding available WBTC for more than 24 hours.

At the snapshot, Chainlink reserves are within the heartbeat and exceed both reported supply figures. No token role grants or revocations since May 7, 2026, no Vault configuration events and no governance Safe owner or threshold changes appeared in the scans. The supply-feeder gap trigger is active, and matured redemption debt slightly exceeds Vault WBTC. Point-in-time prices do not establish whether a sustained depeg occurred between observations.

Open TODOs (Items Not Verifiable This Session)

• Legacy operator remediation: confirm with Bedrock the intended status of the legacy router and its admin EOA 0x3eea50ba10952e5e0dfaa50ecfcc5ab19ad591ef, and whether revocation is planned.
• Supply reconciliation: explain the 700.93 uniBTC difference between feeder and dashboard and the recurring one-day dips (consistent with, but not confirmed as, BOB supply dropping out), and verify complete global liabilities and feed-update methodology.
• Redemption maturity and throughput: reconstruct pre-window requests individually and verify replenishment commitments; a live unpaused router alone does not prove prompt settlement.
• Merlin continuity: M-BTC bridge administrators and mint-relayers were not reverified; the historical onchain basis remains August 8, 2026.
• Operational controls: directBTC minter 0x91fd8c7a… permissions, Free Tunnel hub owner composition.
• Custodian identity / signing setup for BTC backing uniBTC.
• Native-BTC/Babylon position reconciliation: mapping each published reserve address to custodian ownership, Babylon staking transaction, finality provider, slashing status and unbonding state.
• M-BTC bridge assurance: independently verified Bitcoin backing, custody/MPC quorum, complete mint-relayer set, upgrade authority, and a documented unilateral or emergency exit path.
• Mint/burn authority enumeration for non-Ethereum deployments - Ethereum mint authority is enumerated in this report (four direct minters, five Vault operators, and token admin/freezer); the 30+ non-Ethereum deployments each have their own minter/bridge configuration that has not been individually verified.
• CCIPPeer message-authentication configuration and Free Tunnel per-lane limits - both hold MINTER_ROLE; their complete sender/limit configuration was not fully traced.
• September 2024 restitution transactions - onchain Fuzzland-to-Bedrock reimbursement tx hashes are not published.

Sources

• Bedrock docs: https://docs.bedrock.technology/
• Bedrock app: https://app.bedrock.technology/
• Bedrock statistics: https://app.bedrock.technology/statistics
• Bedrock audit reports: https://docs.bedrock.technology/security/audit-reports
• Bedrock GitHub org: https://github.com/Bedrock-Technology
• uniBTC GitHub: https://github.com/Bedrock-Technology/uniBTC
• DefiLlama Bedrock uniBTC: https://defillama.com/protocol/bedrock-unibtc
• DefiLlama Bedrock aggregate: https://defillama.com/protocol/bedrock
• Chainlink uniBTC PoR feed: https://data.chain.link/feeds/ethereum/mainnet/unibtc-por
• Chainlink CCIP chain selectors: https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors
• QuillAudits hack analysis: https://www.quillaudits.com/blog/hack-analysis/bedrock-2million-exploit
• BlockApex hack analysis: https://blockapex.medium.com/unibtc-hack-analysis-bffd6cebd4a8
• Babylon Labs: https://babylonlabs.io/
• Bedrock live reserve composition and linked addresses: https://app.bedrock.technology/statistics
• Merlin M-BTC model and contract: https://docs.merlinchain.io/merlin-docs/user-quick-start/how-to/m-token/what-is-m-token and https://docs.merlinchain.io/merlin-docs/user-quick-start/how-to/m-token/m-token-contract-address
• Merlin bridge security disclosures: https://docs.merlinchain.io/merlin-docs/user-quick-start/how-to/bridge/official-bridge
• Merlin data-availability status: https://docs.merlinchain.io/merlin-docs/about-merlin/key-modules/data-availability
• Merlin bridge source: https://github.com/MerlinLayer2/BTCLayer2BridgeContract
• M-BTC holder distribution: https://scan.merlinchain.io/token/0xB880fd278198bd590252621d4CD071b1842E9Bcd
• Independent Merlin trust-model analysis: https://www.spark.money/research/merlin-chain-bitcoin-l2-analysis
• September 15, 2026 evidence: pinned Ethereum contract/proxy/role/allowlist reads; proxy admin code and nonce checks; legacy router creation, admin history and anvil fork simulation; Free Tunnel hub reads; complete supply feeder Updated history; 30-day mint attribution, router, CCIP pool, Vault asset-flow and Safe event scans; CCIP lane buckets; reserve API, CoinGecko, CoW, DeFiLlama and Merlin explorer observations.
• September 13, 2026 evidence: full paginated role histories and Safe owner sets used as the continuity baseline.
• Bedrock reserve API, DeFiLlama API, and CoinGecko: independently timed market/reserve snapshots recorded in the evidence.
• Reserve/Merlin verification on August 8, 2026: Bedrock dashboard reserve composition and linked addresses; M-BTC totalSupply(), bridgeAddress(), Bedrock reserve balance and holder rank; main bridge version(), admin and mint-relayer reads; EIP-1967 implementation slots; and bytecode-presence checks via Merlin RPC.